Zeal By All Means, But Only Within the Rules by Tremblay, Paul R. & Mokriski, J. Charles
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
March 2004
Zeal By All Means, But Only Within the Rules
Paul R. Tremblay
Boston College Law School, paul.tremblay@bc.edu
J. Charles Mokriski
Day Berry and Howard LLP
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and
the Litigation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul R. Tremblay and J. Charles Mokriski. "Zeal By All Means, But Only Within the Rules." Boston Bar Journal 48, no.2 (2004): 16-17.
By J. Charles Mokriski and Paul R.Tremblay
Zeal By All Means,
But Only Within the Rules
J.Charles Mokriski is a
partner in the Boston
office of Day, Berry &
Howard LLP.
Mr. Mokriski practices in
the areas of intellectual
property litigation,
counseling, and
licensing, administrative
and regulatory law. He
teaches Professional
Responsibility at Boston
College Law School is
and a member and
former chair of the BBA
Ethics Committee.
Paul R.Tremblay is a
Clinical Professor at
Boston College Law
School. He is a member
and past chair of the
BBA Ethics Committee.
awyers, as we all know, are ethically
obligated to serve their clients zealously
and to prot ct client confiden es. At the
same time, they must act honestly and with
candor to the court, deal with their opponents in
good faith, and seek to achieve justice in their
work. Sometimes, and perhaps frequently, these
obligations will clash, so that honoring one will
compromise or sacrifice another. A recent
opinion by the Supreme Judicial Court offers a
vivid example of that kind of conflict, with
unfortunate results for the lawyer involved.
In that case, In the Matter of Robert A. Griffith,
440 Mass. 500 (Dec. 9, 2003), the SJC, overrul-
ing the Board of Bar Overseers, suspended a
lawyer from practice for a year after he concealed
information that would have disclosed his
deceased client's HIV-positive status from
defendants who, the lawyer believed, were acting
in bad faith after covering up a shocking episode
of police brutality. The lawyer's story is a
compelling one in many respects, but his
desperate actions on his client's behalf violated
the rules of pretrial discovery and cost him
dearly. His sanctioning offers important lessons
for lawyers who find themselves enmeshed in
contentious litigation. First, a lawyer's commit-
ment to maintain client confidences must
generally give way to the disclosure obligations
imposed by civil discovery rules, even when such
disclosure would reveal deeply embarrassing or
privileged information. Second, the opinion
erases any lingering doubt about whether a case's
special claim to justice, or a client's vulnerability
or disadvantage, might excuse some bending of
the usual rules of litigation. Even if obeying the
rules is apt to lead to an unjust result, lawyers
depart from them, the BBO observed, "at their
professional peril."
THE GRIFFITH FACTS, BRIEFLY TOLD
The provocative facts of the Griffith case were
downplayed in the SJC opinion, but they were
developed in considerable detail in the BBO
opinion. The lawyer in question, Robert Griffith,
is a Cape Verdean, who practiced in New
Bedford, a community with a large Cape Verdean
population. In 1990, a Cape Verdean man,
Morris Pina, Jr., was beaten to death while in
New Bedford police custody. The death certifi-
cate falsely indicated that he had died of a
cocaine overdose. Pina's mother and sister tried
unsuccessfully for months to find a lawyer to
investigate the suspicious death. Griffith was the
only lawyer willing to take on the New Bedford
police and city establishment. His lawsuit
against the city and the police encountered
"intensely disputatious opposition," according to
the BBO. The federal court proceedings included
233 pretrial discovery docket items alone, many
of them motions by Griffith to compel the city to
comply with its discovery obligations. Griffith
saw the actions of the city and police, and the
tactics of the city's lawyers, as part of a continu-
ing effort to cover up unconscionable official
misconduct.
While preparing the case, Griffith learned that
Pina was HIV-positive, and had been treated by a
doctor for that illness. Relying in part on a
Massachusetts statute, G.L. c. 111 § 70E which is
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designed to protect the confidentiality of
all medical information relating to HIV,
Griffith submitted incomplete and false
discovery responses to the defendants
seeking to prevent disclosure of Pina's
HIV status. He also failed to apprise his
expert witness, engaged to testify about
Pina's life expectancy and hedonic damages,
of Pina's HIV status. Griffith's efforts to
conceal the HIV condition failed when
Pina's sister testified in the trial about
Pina's having visited a doctor known in
the community to treat HIV patients.
After the trial ended, with a jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff (later
settled for $555,000), the United States
District Court trial judge sanctioned
Griffith for his misconduct, fining him
$15,000 and publishing the sanctions
opinion as a form of public reprimand.
The judge refused to refer the matter to the
BBO, both because of the sanctions
imposed by the court, and because, the
judge wrote, it would be "anomalous" if
the respondent were suspended from his
profession while the New Bedford police
officers were not suspended from theirs.
The BBO did receive a referral,
though, most likely from the defendants.
The BBO Hearing Committee found that
Griffith had violated the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility and recommended a
public reprimand, but no suspension,
and the full BBO agreed for reasons
similar to those expressed by the trial
court judge. On Bar Counsel's appeal, the
SIC imposed a one-year suspension.
THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND
PRETRIAL DISCOVERY DISCLOSURES
Nowhere in its opinion did the SIC
address a lawyer's ethical obligation not
to disclose the secrets and confidential
information of his client. Few, if any,
would argue that the ethics confidential-
ity rules by themselves override the
mandate to respond completely and
honestly to discovery requests, since such
a policy would eviscerate the discovery
process. However, the fact that the
confidential information that Griffith was
attempting to hide in this case was Pina's
HIV status, a condition that is covered by
the strong policy of confidentiality
contained in M.G.L. c. 111 § 70F, changed
the equation significantly. While the
Code of Professional Responsibility (in
effect when this case was pending), as
well as the present Rules of Professional
Conduct, create an exception permitting
disclosure of otherwise confidential
information "when required by law or
court order," here there was a state statute
arguably at odds with that exception. It is
unfortunate that the SIC failed to address
at all the colorable conflict between the
Code's confidentiality obligation,
buttressed by c. 111 § 70F's HIV confiden-
tiality protection, and the dictates of court
rules requiring full and truthful discovery.
The SIC simply said, without elabora-
tion, that Griffith "should have objected
to the discovery requests." The court
brushed aside the concern that the mere
lodging of an objection based on c. 111 §
70F would reveal the very information
that the statute was designed to keep
confidential. Indeed, it assumed that an
objection by Griffith based on that statute
would have had that result, declaring that
"the respondent's actions threatened the
integrity of the trial because they pre-
vented the judge from fashioning
complete and appropriate preliminary
instructions to the jury and may also have
affected the judge's evidentiary rulings on
the issue of damages." The ramifications
of this language-that the trial court
would have informed its jury instructions
with Pina's HIV condition-appears
inconsistent with the statutorily man-
dated protection of the confidentiality of
HIV status, a protection that the SIC had
earlier suggested, in Commonwealth v.
Ortiz, No. SJC-2001-0055, is "absolute."
The BBO's opinion contained some
advice helpful to future litigators caught
in similar conflicts, recommending a
variety of measures that Griffith might
have undertaken: in camera review, a
motion for a protective order, or advice
from ethics counsel, a bar association
ethics committee, or Bar Counsel's ethics
hotline. These are helpful suggestions,
but in the end, the idea of in camera
review seems the only one offering
Griffith some practical way out of his felt
dilemma.
A LAWYER'S RESPONSE TO INJUSTICE
The message from Griffith is a simple one.
Even when confronted by deep injustice
and obstructionist opposing counsel, a
lawyer must nevertheless comply with all
of the rules of litigation. Although the
trial court judge appeared moved by
Griffith's having fought a good fight on
behalf of a disadvantaged man who had
been treated shamefully by the authori-
ties, the SIC rejected the notion that
considerations of justice should enter the
equation at all. Describing Griffith as
"obsessed" while litigating a "conten-
tious" case, the SIC dismissed Griffith's c.
111 § 70F arguments as "irrelevant," and
refused to consider the context of the case
as providing any basis for mitigation of
discipline.
The BBO was less harsh. While it, like
the SIC, refused to recognize the justice of
Griffith's cause as a mitigating factor, it
tempered its sanctions with mercy,
imposing a public reprimand rather than
suspension, recognizing that Griffith's
misconduct was overlaid with "novel
issues respecting the nature and scope of
the statutory protection accorded those
diagnosed with HIV" and considering the
"corrosive effect of the widespread
publicity" that attended the sanctions and
fine imposed by the District Court. But at
the same time the BBO made it clear that
it regarded Griffith's violation of the rules
a serious matter and one not to be
countenanced. The BBO addressed the
issue of justice this way: "One of the
reasons we reject the suggestion that the
perceived justness of a cause should
mitigate misconduct is that lawyers tend
to think that their cases fall into such a
category."
In hindsight a lawyer might be able
dispassionately to assess which cases are
just and which are not, but for a litigator
in the smoke of battle, such judgments
are hazardous. And regardless of how
noble a lawyer's cause, how sympathetic
his client, or how evil the other side
appears, the lawyer must follow the rules. E
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